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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1990 revisions to the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.")
codify rules governing an accord and satisfaction by use of a
negotiable instrument.' This article examines these rules in light of the
history and policy of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
The doctrine originally developed at common law. In addition,
various statutes have addressed issues related to accord and satis-
faction over the years, although the reach of some of these statutes has
been unclear. Recently, section 3-311 of the U.C.C. was promulgated
to establish the boundaries of the doctrine in cases involving a nego-
tiable instrument.
Part II of this article examines the common law roots of the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction. Part III examines various statutes that have
affected the common law rules, at least one of which appears to have
done so unintentionally. Part IV examines and evaluates the rules of
new U.C.C. section 3-311, and Part V considers whether the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction is a beneficial adjunct to commercial law.
Part VI then concludes that despite its faults, the doctrine of accord and
satisfaction is here to stay, and that new section 3-311 offers worth-
while improvements to the common law.
II. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AT COMMON LAW
Accord and satisfaction is a long-standing doctrine of common law.
It can often help provide finality in settling certain disputes. The
common law rules of accord and satisfaction have their roots in the
rules of contract.2 If the parties wanted to substitute a new contract in
place of the old one, resulting in a novation, they were free to do So.
3
Nevertheless, the parties needed consideration to do this, and payment
of a portion of the prior debt could not satisfy this requirement.4 If the
1. U.C.C. § 3-311, 2 U.L.A. 85-89 (1991). See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying
text for explanation of the term "negotiable instrument."
2. See, e.g., Wilfredo Caraballo, The Tender Trap: U.C.C. § 1-207 and Its
Applicability to an Attempted Accord and Satisfaction by Tendering a Check in a
Dispute Arising from a Sale of Goods, II SErON HALL L. REV. 445, 446-49 (1981).
3. Id. at 447.
4. This rule has been attributed by commentators to dictum in Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng.
Rep. 237 (C.P. 1602), which was followed by Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (H.L.
1884). See Albert J. Rosenthal, Discord and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the
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prior debt was unliquidated, disputed, or not yet due, however, partial
payment could be consideration for the entire debt to be discharged.'
As the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction continued to
evolve, the efficacy of partial payments increased. For example, there
is support for finding an accord and satisfaction in cases where the
debtor pays the minimum amount conceded to be owed.6 There is
even some support for finding an accord and satisfaction where the
debtor pays less than the amount concededly owed.7
The common law rules of accord and satisfaction have been stated in
various ways. One of the most succinct definitions appears in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts: "An accord is a contract under
which an obligee promises to accept a stated performance in satis-
faction of the obligor's existing duty. Performance of the accord
discharges the original duty." 8 An accord and satisfaction typically
occurs in cases where an obligation has been disputed. To reach an
accord and satisfaction, a creditor9 agrees to accept something different
from or less than his full claim as satisfaction of the debt.'0 Often a
debtor will tender a check payable to a creditor with a notation stating
that the check is "payment in full" of the debt, or similar wording."
Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 48, 52 (1978); Caraballo, supra note 2,
at 446-47.
5. Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 53. For a more extensive discussion of the evolution
of accord and satisfaction, see Caraballo, supra note 2, at 446-51, and Rosenthal, supra
note 4, at 51-58.
6. See Caraballo, supra note 2, at 449-50.
7. Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 53.
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 281(l) (1981).
9. In this article, "creditor" is used to signify the person or entity claiming to be
owed, and "debtor" is used to signify a person or entity allegedly owing a debt or
obligation. Often, the debtor draws a check payable to the creditor. The new accord and
satisfaction provision of U.C.C. Article 3 uses the terms "person against whom a claim
is asserted" to signify the debtor, and "claimant" for the creditor. U.C.C. § 3-311, 2
U.L.A. 85-86 (1991). This provision applies to situations where a check or other
negotiable instrument is involved. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Homewood Dairy Prods. Co. v. Robinson, 48 So. 2d 28, 33 (Ala.
1950); Fuller v. Kemp, 33 N.E. 1034, 1034 (N.Y. 1893).
1 1. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-24,
at 607 (3d ed. 1988). Alternatively, the check may be accompanied by a letter stating
that the check represents payment in full. Either way, such a check is referred to as a
"full payment check." If the creditor obtains payment of the check and the creditor's
claim is sufficiently disputed or unliquidated the common law provides that the claim is
fully discharged. See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
A study of the case law reveals numerous forms of the "payment in full" language that
courts have found sufficient to reach an accord and satisfaction. Some of the language is
relatively simple. E.g., Edgar v. Hitch 294 P.2d 3, 4 (Cal. 1956) ("Pd. in full for all Hay
Bought From John Edgar @ 32.50 Ton"); Wood Bros. Const. Co. v. Simons-Eastern
Co., 389 S.E.2d 382, 383 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) ("[F]inal payment except for the sum of
1994]
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At common law, a creditor who obtained payment by means of such a
full payment check ran a substantial risk of being bound to an accord
and satisfaction; the only way the creditor could reliably preserve the
unpaid portion of the claim was to avoid accepting the check.' 2
Professors White and Summers, in their well-known U.C.C. treatise,
once described this type of transaction as "an exquisite form of
commercial torture."'' 3
$2000.00 withheld for completion of grassing."); Sawner v. M.P. Smith Const. Co.,
526 S.W.2d 492, 496 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975) ("Acct. in full 6/3 - 6/16/71"); Charleston
Urban Renewal Auth. v. Stanley, 346 S.E.2d 740, 741 (W. Va: 1985) ("January rent in
full").
On the other hand, some of the language used is very detailed and specific. For
example, in Western Branch Holding Co. v. Trans Mktg. Houston, Inc., 722 F. Supp.
1339 (E.D. Va. 1989), the following language was used:
By its acceptance and negotiation of this draft, Nitrex accepts this instrument
as payment in full from Trans Marketing Houston, Inc., of all sums owing to
Nitrex under the terms of one certain Urea Product Purchase Agreement,
TMGP-2179/88, between Trans Marketing Houston, Inc. and Nitrex on or
about May 4, 1988, and Nitrex does further release Trans Marketing Houston,
Inc. from any other and further liability with respect to said Urea Product
Purchase Agreement TMGP-2179/88.
Western Branch Holding Co., 772 F. Supp. at 1340; see also Ennia Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Auld, 506 So. 2d 62, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("By endorsing the draft the payees
accept same in full settlement and release of all claims arising out of occurrence
mentioned on the face hereof."). In Phillips v. Phillips Const. Co., 136 S.E.2d 48
(N.C. 1964), the debtor used the following language:
The payee by endorsement hereon acknowledges receipt of this final payment
in the amount of $3,451.89 as full payment and complete settlement for all
work performed under subcontract dated October 15, 1957, with Phillips
Construction Co., Inc., and/or D. L. Phillips, Builder, and/or Myrtle Beach
AFB Housing, Inc., and/or No. 2 and 3 and claims for any and all work
performed in addition to subject subcontract at the Myrtle Beach AFB Housing
Projects.
Phillips, 136 S.E.2d at 51.
12. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 13-24, at 607-08 ("If the payee indorses
the check and receives payment, he has accepted the contract and so discharged his claim
for a larger amount") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 2, 2
U.L.A. 85 (1991).
13. JAMES J. WHITE& ROBERT R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §13-21, at
544 (2d ed. 1980). In the current edition of their treatise, Professors White and Summers
have substituted the less colorful phrase "exquisite dilemma." WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 11, § 13-24, at 607. While both phrases probably denote the same message, the
omission of the former phrasing represents a loss to the field of commercial law. The
term "torture" better expresses the drama of certain commercial law issues. Some,
perhaps many, students find the U.C.C. tedious. This view has some basis; the "scope"
provision of Article 6 on bulk sales provides an example. See U.C.C. § 6-103, 2C
U.L.A. 67-68 (1991). However, commercial law encompasses many dramatic siiuations
that can have a profound effect on a person's livelihood. Furthermore, financial
reversals sometimes have life and death implications. See, e.g., Witold Zygulski,
Farmers End Hunger Strike: Debt Relief Victory, THE WARSAW VOICE, November 24,
1991 (describing end of hunger strike that farmers had engaged in to force bank into
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Consequently, the analysis of whether parties have entered into an
accord and satisfaction is heavily fact specific.' 4 Some authorities
have taken the view that unless there is new consideration, only a
disputed or unliquidated claim may be the subject of an accord and
satisfaction, 5 but this rule is subject to numerous exceptions. 16 This
requirement is also quite elastic. A court wishing to find an accord and
satisfaction should usually be able to see some element of dispute in
almost any litigated transaction, unless the debtor has been honest or
careless enough to concede that he owed the full amount. Conversely,
a court wishing to avoid finding an accord and satisfaction can find
that there was no "real" dispute. 7
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction remains alive and well at
common law. However, the common law is not the only source of
rules on accord and satisfaction. The remainder of this article con-
siders the various statutory incursions into the realm of accord and
satisfaction.
III. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION UNDER PRIOR STATUTES
Prior to the recent promulgation of section 3-311, accord and
satisfaction had been considered by many authorities. Several states
have enacted statutes prescribing rules for accord and satisfaction
similar to common law rules. 18 Some states have also enacted statutes
limiting the common law rules of accord and satisfaction.' 9 In
renegotiating debt); The Home-Grown Homeless, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 15, 1989,
at 10A; Stephen Lilly, And Now the Drought, 4 Bus. FIRST-COLUMBUS, July 18, 1988, §
2, at 3; Farm Debt Help Sought, CHI. TRIB., February 12, 1986, at 3; Laurent Belsie,
Pulling Together When Financial Troubles Pull Them Apart, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, December 18, 1985, at 3.
14. See, e.g., Flowers v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 693 F.2d 1146, 1152-53 (5th
Cir. 1982); Security Transactions, Inc. v. Nelson Excavating and Paving Co., 314 So.
2d 297, 302 (Ala. Civ. App.), cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 304 (Ala. 1975).
15. See, e.g., Homewood Dairy Prods. Co. v. Robinson, 48 So. 2d 28, 33 (Ala.
1950); Cunningham v. Irwin, 148 N.W. 786, 787 (Mich. 1914); Schnell v. Perlmon,
144 N.E. 641, 642-43 (N.Y.), remittitur denied, 147 N.E. 171 (N.Y. 1924); Fuller v.
Kemp, 33 N.E. 1034, 1035 (N.Y. 1803).
16. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Clark, 178 U.S. 353, 364-
69 (1900); Cunningham, 148 N.W. at 787-88.
17. Cf. Wm. Alan Baird, Note, Role of the Check in Accord and Satisfaction: Weapon
of the Overreaching Debtor, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 99, 101 (1948) (observing that the
concept of unliquidated or disputed claims "escapes exact definition").
18. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 8-1-20, 21, 22, 23 (1993); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1521-
1526 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 13-4-100 to 13-4-104 (1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 28-1-1401 to -1403 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540 (1993); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 9-13-04 to -07 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-7-1 to -4 (1987).
19. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1525 (West 1982) (permitting partial payment of a
disputed amount without resulting in an accord and satisfaction as to the whole); GA.
1994]
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addition, the U.C.C. itself has approached the issue in several
contexts.
Section A describes the controversy over whether section 1-207 of
the U.C.C. provided a way for creditors to obtain payment of full
payment checks but avoid the effect of the full payment legends.
Section B describes a former provision of U.C.C. Article 3 that at-
tempted to codify the rules of accord and satisfaction involving
negotiable instruments. Section C notes the deletion of former U.C.C.
section 3-112(1)(f), which is no longer necessary now that section 3-
311 explicitly contemplates the presence of full payment terms in
negotiable instruments.
A. U.C.C. Section 1-207
Prior to the 1990 revisions, section 1-207 read: "A party who with
explicit reservation of rights performs or promises performance or
assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other
party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as
'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or the like are sufficient."2 ° The
question of whether former U.C.C. section 1-207 applied to an accord
and satisfaction has been extremely controversial. 2' The controversy
CODE ANN. § 13-4-103(b) (1979) (rendering a full payment check ineffective unless
there is an independent agreement for accord and satisfaction); UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-
3-607 (1990) (providing that a full payment check is effective to establish an accord and
satisfaction only if the payee or its officer agrees in writing to accept the amount in full
satisfaction).
20. U.C.C. § 1-207, 1 U.L.A. 145 (1989). This provision appeared in the same form,
with the same section number, as early as the May 1950 Proposed Final Draft of the
U.C.C. See U.C.C. § 1-207 (1950), reprinted in 10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
DRAFTS 40 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly ed., 1984).
21. See U.C.C. § 1-207 cmt. 3, 1 U.L.A. 39 (1991 & Supp. 1994). Prior to the 1990
revisions, a number of commentators addressed this issue. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS,
supra note 11, § 13-24, at 608-10; Caraballo, supra note 2; Louis F. Del Duca, Handling
"Full Payment" Checks, 13 UCC L.J. 195 (1981); Patricia B. Fry, You Can't Have Your
Cake and Eat It Too: Accord and Satisfaction Survives the Uniform Commercial Code, 61
N.D. L. REV. 353 (1985); W. Jack Grosse & Edward P. Goggin, Accord and Satisfaction
and the 1-207 Dilemma, 89 COMM. L.J. 537 (1984); W. Jack Grosse & Edward P.
Goggin, The 1-207 Dilemma Revisited, 16 N. Ky. L. REV. 425 (1989) [hereinafter The
Dilemma Revisited]; William D. Hawkland, The Effect of U.C.C. § 1-207 on the
Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 COMM. L.J. 329 (1969);
Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 53; Morris G. Shanker, The Folly of Full Settlement
Checks-and a Declaration of their Independence, 90 COMM. L.J. 7 (1985); Paula G.
Walter, The Rise and Fall of U.C.C. Section 1-207 and the Full Payment Check-
Checkmate? 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 81 (1987); Kimm A. Massengill, Comment, U.C.C.
Section 1-207 and the Doctrine of Accord and Satisfaction: Ohio's About-Face in AFC
Interiors v. Dicello, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1617 (1991); Pamela K. Strom Amlung, Note,
Ohio's Interpretation of Uniform Commercial Code Section 1-207-You Can Have Your
Cake and Eat It Too, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1001 (1991).
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has centered on whether the payee of a full payment check may accept
the check, yet avoid being bound by an accord and satisfaction, by
noting on the check or in a separate communication that the check was
taken "with reservation of rights" or a similar phrase. Courts in a
minority of states have held or suggested that section 1-207 does offer
this alternative.22 Professors White and Summers took this position in
their U.C.C. treatise, before the 1990 revisions to the U.C.C. 23
The 1990 revisions redesignated the existing language of section 1-
207 as subsection (1) of that section and added a new subsection (2),
which provides: "Subsection (1) does not apply to an accord and
satisfaction. 24 To the extent that states adopt the 1990 revisions, the
controversy will be resolved. The new subsection (2) of section 1-207
explicitly adopts the view that the section is not intended to supersede
22. See, e.g., Bivins v. White Dairy, 378 So. 2d 1122 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979), cert.
denied, 378 So. 2d 1125 (Ala. 1980); Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978); Ditch Witch Trenching Co. v. C & S Carpentry Serv., 812 S.W.2d 171,
172-73 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Majestic Bldg. Material Corp. v. Gateway Plumbing, Inc.,
694 S.W.2d 762, 765-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., 488 N.E.2d 56,60 (N.Y. 1985); Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid
Carolina Corp., 167 S.E.2d 85, 92-93 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969); AFC Interiors v. DiCello,
544 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ohio 1989); Kilander v. Blickle Co., 571 P.2d 503, 505 (Or.
1977); Strauss, Factor, Hillman & Lopes, P.C. v. Kohler Gen. Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 466 (R.I. Dist. Ct. 1987); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490
(S.D. 1976); Robinson v. Garcia, 804 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. Ct. App.), writ denied,
817 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1991); Frangiosa v. Kapoukranidis, 627 A.2d 351 (Vt. 1993); cf.
American Food Purveyors v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 265 S.E.2d 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980)
(applying, but criticizing, the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling that section 1-207 does
not permit a payee of a full-payment check to both accept the check and avoid reaching
an accord and satisfaction); U.C.C. § 3-311 cmts. 1-2, 2 U.L.A. 86 (1990); The Dilemma
Revisited, supra note 21, at 430 n.22; Fry, supra note 21, at 358, 363-64; Vitauts M.
Gulbis, Annotation, Application of UCC § 1-207 to Avoid Discharge of Disputed Claim
Upon Qualified Acceptance of Check Tendered as Payment in Full, 37 A.L.R. 4TH 358
(1985). But see Ennia Gen. Ins. Co. v. Auld, 506 So. 2d 62, 63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987); Eder v. Yvette B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1981); McKee Const. Co. v. Stanley Plumbing & Heating Co., 828 S.W.2d 700, 701-06
(Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Barber v. White, 264 S.E.2d 385, 386 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980);
Brown v. Coastal Truckways Inc., 261 S.E.2d 266, 269 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Les
Schwab Tire Ctrs., Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 664 P.2d 419, 420-21 (Or. Ct. App. 1983);
Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources, Inc., 782 S.W.2d 279, 281 (Tex. Ct. App.
1989); Pileco, Inc. v. HCI, Inc., 735 S.W.2d 561, 562-63 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
23. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 13-24, at 608-10. In the 1993 pocket part to
the treatise, Professors White and Summers acknowledge that the 1990 revisions to the
U.C.C. represent a return to the common law rule that a creditor' who negotiates a full
payment check may not avoid an accord and satisfaction by accepting the check with a
reservation of rights. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 13-6, at 31-32 (3d ed. Supp. 1993).
24. U.C.C. § 1-207(2). 1 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1994). The 1990 revisions also added two
commas to the text of subsection (I) which do not appear to change its meaning. See
U.C.C. § 1-207(1), 1 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1994).
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the common law of accord and satisfaction, 25 and new section 3-311
sets out specific rules for an accord and satisfaction involving a
negotiable instrument.26
B. Former U.C.C. Section 3-802(3)
The 1990 version of U.C.C. Article 3 is not the first to codify
specific rules applicable to accord and satisfaction, although it has been
some years since such a provision appeared in Article 3. The 1952
Official Draft of the U.C.C. contained the following provision:
Where a check or similar payment instrument provides that it is
in full satisfaction of an obligation the payee discharges the
underlying obligation by obtaining payment of the instrument
unless he establishes that the original obligor has taken
unconscionable advantage in the circumstances.
25. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (noting the ambiguity of the prior
section).
26. See infra part 1V.B.
27. U.C.C. § 3-802(3) (1952), reprinted in 14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTs,
supra note 20, at 465; see also Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 58-63. The Official Comment
to this provision states:
Checks are frequently given with a term providing that they are "in full
payment of all claims," or similar language. The holder who obtains payment
of such a check takes its benefits subject to the drawer's stipulation that he
releases the original obligation. Even where the obligation is for an
undisputed and liquidated debt there is no unfairness in the tender and
acceptance of an accord and satisfaction; and in this respect subsection (3)
changes the law in a number of states.
The exception stated as to unconscionable advantage taken by the obligor
has been recognized in a considerable number of decisions. A genuine accord
and satisfaction is to be found only where the parties are dealing at arm's
length and on fair terms of bargaining equality, without unfair advantage taken
by either party.
The following cases illustrate the application of the exception:
a. The debtor sends the creditor a false statement of their account with a
check which stipulates that it is in full payment. The creditor cashes the
check in good faith reliance on the statement of account. The original
obligation is not discharged.
b. The debtor, knowing that it is the practice of the creditor's clerks to put
through checks without examining accounts, sends a check for half the
amount due which states that it is in full payment. The check is cashed
without examining the account. The obligation is not discharged.
c. The debtor sends a check for less than the amount due which states that it
is in full payment. The creditor insists that the amount is not correct, and
finally cashes the check as the only available means of obtaining any
payment. The original obligation is not discharged.
d. An employer hands an employee a check for less than the full amount of
wages due which states that it is in full payment, and threatens to fire the
employee if he does hot accept the amount. When the employee cashes the
check the original obligation is not discharged.
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Similar provisions appeared in the drafts of 1947, 1948 and 1949.8
The U.C.C. Editorial Board recommended that section 3-802(3) be
deleted because it "evoked criticism on the ground that it would work
hardship, and was open to abuse. ' 29 As a result, the 1957 Official
Edition of the U.C.C. did not contain the provision.30
C. Former U.C.C. Section 3-112(1)(f)
Prior to the 1990 revisions, Article 3 contained a provision that the
negotiability3' of an instrument was not defeated by "a term in a draft
providing that the payee by indorsing or cashing it acknowledges full
satisfaction of an obligation of the drawer., 32 This provision has been
deleted from the 1990 version of Article 3.
The addition of section 3-311 makes prior section 3-112(1)(f)
superfluous. The only function of prior section 3-112(1)(f) was to
make clear that including a full payment legend on a check or other
type of draft did not prevent the check or draft from being a negotiable
instrument. New section 3-311 sets forth explicit rules for accord and
satisfaction using a negotiable instrument. These rules clearly contem-
plate that a negotiable instrument, such as a check or other draft, may
contain a full payment legend. Section 3-112(1)(f) is, therefore, no
longer necessary. If a check or draft containing the full payment
legend contemplated by section 3-311 could not be a negotiable instru-
e. An employer hands an employee a check for less than the full amount of
wages due which states that it is in full payment. He refuses the employee's
demands for the proper amount, and the employee cashes the check in order
to obtain money for subsistence. The obligation is not discharged.
U.C.C. § 3-802 cmt. 5 (1952), reprinted in 14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS,
supra note 20, at 466-67; see also Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 59 n.45.
28. See Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 58-59.
29. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 132 (1957), reprinted in 18 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS,
supra note 20, at 156.
30. See U.C.C. § 3-802 (1957), reprinted in 18 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS,
supra note 20, at 156; Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 60.
3 1. Article 3 of the U.C.C. only applies to "negotiable" instruments. See infra notes
50-55 and accompanying text.
32. U.C.C. § 3-112(l)(f), 2 U.L.A. 349 (1991). This provision appeared in its
current form with its current section number as early as the 1952 Official Draft of the
U.C.C. See 14 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS, supra note 20, at 322. The same
provision, with slightly different wording, appeared in the 1947 Tentative Draft No. 2
of Article 3. According to that provision, the negotiability of an instrument was not
affected by "a term in a bill providing that the payee by indorsing or cashing the bill
acknowledges full satisfaction of an obligation of the maker or drawer." COMMERCIAL
CODE TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2-ARTICLE 1II § 10(l)(h) (1947), reprinted in 3 UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE: DRAFTS, supra note 20, at 59.
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ment, section 3-311 would not belong in Article 3, which typically
applies only to negotiable instruments.33
IV. THE 1990 REVISIONS TO U.C.C. ARTICLE 3: A NEW
APPROACH TO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Article 3 of the U.C.C. was revised in 1990 to reflect changes in
legislation, regulations, practices, and technology applicable to nego-
tiable instruments. 34 These revisions include a new section 3-311
which explicitly codifies the applicable rules of when an accord and
satisfaction takes place.35 In addition, the drafters added a new
subsection (2) to section 1-207, rejecting the minority view that this
section provides an escape hatch from accord and satisfaction. Courts
in some states have held that the payee of a full payment check could
avoid the application of the common law rules of accord and satis-
faction by accepting the check "under protest" or "with reservation of
33. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
34. See Prefatory Note to Revised U.C.C. Article 3, 2 U.L.A. 7-8 (1991).
35. Section 3-311 provides as follows:
(a) If a person against whom a claim is asserted proves that (i) that person in
good faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full satisfaction of the
claim, (ii) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide
dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument, the
following subsections apply.
(b) Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against
whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying
written communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that
the instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim.
(c) Subject to subsection (d), a claim is not discharged under subsection (b) if
either of the following applies:
(1) The claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time
before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person
against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning
disputed debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a
debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office, or place, and (ii) the
instrument or accompanying communication was not received by that
designated person, office, or place.
(2) The claimant, whether or not an organization, proves that within 90
days after payment of the instrument, the claimant tendered repayment of the
amount of the instrument to the person against whom the claim is asserted.
This paragraph does not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a
statement complying with paragraph (1)(i).
(d) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted
proves that within a reasonable time before collection of the instrument was
initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having direct
responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the
instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.
U.C.C. § 3-311, 2 U.L.A. 85-86 (1991).
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rights. 36
By its terms,37 and by virtue of its being a part of Article 3 of the
U.C.C., 38 section 3-311 will apply only to an accord and satisfaction
involving the use of a negotiable instrument. 39 Therefore, there will
continue to be situations where an accord and satisfaction will be
reached entirely outside the U.C.C. 40 Nevertheless, as the common
law doctrine of accord and satisfaction continues to evolve, courts
might elect to incorporate some of the concepts of section 3-311 into
the common law. The drafters of revised Article 3 anticipated that their
rules may be applied in cases beyond those involving negotiable
instruments.4
A. The Elements of Accord and Satisfaction Under Section 3-311
Subsections (a) and (b) of section 3-311 set forth a number of
elements that the debtor must satisfy in order to have an accord and
satisfaction. To start, the debtor must have acted in good faith.42
Good faith is now defined for purposes of U.C.C. Article 3 as
"honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing. 43 Previously, the definition was "honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."'  The old definition is
generally viewed as intending a purely subjective standard of good
faith, 45 although courts applying the old definition have not limited
their consideration in this way and have incorporated objective
36. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 35.
38. See U.C.C. § 3-102, 2 U.L.A. 19-20 (1991) (stating that Article III applies to
negotiable instruments).
39. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
40. See, e.g., Cobb v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 589 So. 2d 728 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1991). Cobb involved a loan secured by an automobile. The debtor was behind on
her payments and returned the car to the dealership, later testifying that she relied upon a
statement by a representative of the creditor that returning the car would satisfy her
entire obligation on the loan. Id. at 730. Although the trial court had granted summary
judgment for the creditor, the appellate court reversed, indicating that if the debtor could
prove the facts that she alleged, she could establish a defense of accord and satisfaction.
Id. at 732-33.
41. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 2, 2 U.L.A. 27 (1991).
42. See U.C.C. § 3-311(a), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991).
43. U.C.C. § 3-103(a)(4), 2 U.L.A. 22 (1991).
44. U.C.C. § 1-201(19), 1 U.L.A. 65 (1989). The general definitions in Article I
apply throughout the U.C.C. unless supplanted by another definition specific to a
particular article. U.C.C. § 1-201, 1 U.L.A. 63 (1989). Thus, the definition from
section 1-201(19) applied to accord and satisfaction until 1990, when the drafters added
the new definition in section 3-103(a)(4). U.C.C. § 3-103 cmt. 4, 2 U.L.A. 22 (1991).
45. WHIrE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 14-6, at 629.
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elements in their analyses.46 The new definition goes along with the
approach of these courts and adds an explicit objective component to
the definition of good faith in Article 3.47
The duty to act in good faith pervades the U.C.C. 48 Acting in good
faith is not usually stated as a specific element for establishing an
accord and satisfaction at common law; nevertheless, the good faith
requirement found in section 3-311 is consistent with common law
cases holding that fraud or concealment renders an attempted accord
and satisfaction ineffective.49
In addition to acting in good faith, the debtor must use an
"instrument" in order to obtain an accord and satisfaction under section
3-3 11.50 "Instrument" is shorthand for "negotiable instrument,"5' and
the requisites for negotiable instruments are set forth at section 3-
104.52 In general, negotiable instruments are divided into two
46. See WHITE& SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 14-6, at 629-31.
47. A task force of the American Bar Association Section on Business Law, Uniform
Commercial Code Committee, recommended a similar revision to the general U.C.C.
definition of good faith in section 1-201(19). As revised, section 1-201(19) would have
read: "'Good faith' means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable standards of
fair dealing in the conduct or transaction concerned." ABA Section of Business Law
UCC COMMr-rrEE UPDATE 10 (June 1993); see also Fred H. Miller, The Benefits of New
UCC Articles 3 and 4, 24 UCC L.J. 99, 116 n.95 (1991). However, the U.C.C.
Permanent Editorial Board subsequently decided to change the definition of good faith in
Article I only if the drafting committees for the other Articles of the U.C.C. adopt the
definition in revised Article 3. Letter from Fred H. Miller, Kenneth McAfee Centennial
Professor of Law and George Lynn Cross Research Professor, The University of
Oklahoma College of Law, to Gene A. Marsh, Associate Professor of Law, The
University of Alabama I (Aug. 17, 1993) (copy on file with the author).
48. The U.C.C. itself explicitly states: "Every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement." U.C.C. § 1-
203, 1 U.L.A. 109 (1991).
49. See, e.g., Metropolitan State Bank v. Cox, 302 P.2d 188, 193 (Colo. 1956); cf.
U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 4, 2 U.L.A. 87 (1991) (analyzing circumstances under which the
good faith requirement might not be met in the context of section 3-311); WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 1-6, at 60.
50. U.C.C. § 3-311(a)(i), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991); see also HENRY J. BAILEY & RICHARD
B. HAGEDORN, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS: THE LAW ON BANK CHECKS 4.17 (7th ed.
1992).
51. U.C.C. § 3-104(b), 2 U.L.A. 25 (1991).
52. Section 3-104 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), "negotiable instrument"
means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with
or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into
possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person
promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of
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categories, notes and drafts.53 A check is a particular type of draft54
and is the type of negotiable instrument most commonly associated
with an accord and satisfaction.5"
The next requirement of section 3-3 11 is that the negotiable instru-
ment must have been "tendered... as full satisfaction of the claim."56
This element largely tracks the common law requirement. Next, the
claim must be unliquidated or disputed.5 8 This is a stricter rule than
that followed by some cases decided under the common law.59 Next,
the section only applies if "the claimant obtained payment of the
instrument., 60 This tracks the common law rule that a full payment
legend on a check becomes binding when the creditor obtains payment
of the check.6'
The final requirement for establishing an accord and satisfaction
under section 3-3 11 is that the debtor must "prove[] that the instrument
or an accompanying written communication contained a conspicuous
money, but the promise or order may contain (i) an undertaking or power to
give, maintain, or protect collateral to secure payment, (ii) an authorization
or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of
collateral, or (iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the
advantage or protection of an obligor.
(c) An order that meets all of the requirements of subsection (a), except
paragraph (1), and otherwise falls within the definition of "check" in
subsection (f) is a negotiable instrument and a check.
(d) A promise or order other than a check is not an instrument if, at the time it
is issued or first comes into possession of a holder, it contains a conspicuous
statement, however expressed, to the effect that the promise or order is not
negotiable or is not an instrument governed by this Article.
U.C.C. § 3-104, 2 U.L.A. 25 (1991).
53. U.C.C. § 3-104 cmt. 4, 2 U.L.A. 28 (1991). "An instrument is a 'note' if it is a
promise and is a 'draft' if it is an order. If an instrument falls within the definition of
both 'note' and 'draft,' a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either."
U.C.C. § 3-104(e), 2 U.L.A. 26 (1991).
54. The U.C.C. states that: "'Check' means (i) a draft, other than a documentary draft,
payable on demand and drawn on a bank or (ii) a cashier's check or teller's check. An
instrument may be a check even though it is described on its face by another term, such
as 'money order."' U.C.C. § 3-104(f), 2 U.L.A. 26 (1991).
55. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmts. 1-7, 2 U.L.A. 86-89 (1991) (using frequent examples
involving checks).
56. U.C.C. § 3-311(a)(i), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991); see also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, SUpra
note 50, at 4.17.
57. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
58. U.C.C. § 3-311 (a)(ii), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991); see also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra
note 50, at 4.17.
59. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
60. U.C.C. § 3-31 l(a)(iii), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991); see also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra
note 50, at 4.17.
6 1. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
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statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered as full
satisfaction of the claim., 62  The U.C.C. defines "conspicuous
statement" objectively.63 Almost any statement on a check will be
conspicuous if the creditor can be expected to examine the check.64
Therefore, full payment legends on manually processed checks will
almost always be "conspicuous." Such legends may not be conspic-
uous on checks processed mechanically, however, because a human
creditor does not personally indorse these checks. A creditor that
receives a full payment check processed mechanically might argue that
the full payment legend was not "conspicuous," and therefore should
not be the basis of an accord and satisfaction.65
Subject to certain exceptions, 66 the general effect under section 3-
311 of obtaining payment of a full payment check, as under the
common law,67 is that the creditor is deemed to have accepted the
proffered payment as payment in full and thereby loses the ability to
sue for the unpaid balance.68
B. The New Rules for Accord and Satisfaction
for Negotiable Instruments
The general rules for the application of section 3-311 are largely
similar to the common law rules for accord and satisfaction. An
accord and satisfaction under section 3-311 is, however, subject to
new rules as well. These new rules are set forth at sections 3-31 l(c)
62. U.C.C. § 3-311(b), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991); see also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note
50, at 4.17.
63. According to the U.C.C., the statement must be "so written that a reasonable
person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it." U.C.C. § 1-201(10), 1
U.L.A. 64 (1991); U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 4, 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991).
64. U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 4, 2 U.L.A. 87 (1991). According to the commentary:
In cases in which the claimant is an individual the claimant will receive the
check and will normally indorse it. Since the statement concerning tender in
full satisfaction normally will appear above the space provided for the
claimant's indorsement of the check, the claimant "ought to have noticed" the
statement.
Id.
65. U.C.C. § 3-311(c) provides additional ways that a creditor can avoid the
imposition of an accord and satisfaction, such as by providing special notice to the
debtor or by returning the payment within 90 days. See infra part IV.B. 1.
66. For a discussion of these exceptions, see infra part IV.B. 1.
67. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
68. If the requirements are fulfilled, U.C.C. § 3-311(b) specifies the outcome:
"Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is discharged if the person against whom the
claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written communication
contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was tendered in full
satisfaction of the claim." U.C.C. § 3-311 (b), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991).
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and (d). The next two subsections of this Article focus on the
mechanics of U.C.C. sections 3-31 1(c) and (d). The text outlines the
mechanisms for preventing an inadvertent accord and satisfaction that
are set forth at 3-31 (c), and then discusses the limitations on these
mechanisms set forth at 3-31 (d).
1. Subsection (c) of Section 3-311 Provides Ways to Guard
Against Inadvertent Accord and Satisfaction
Modern techniques for processing large volumes of checks have
replaced human beings with machines in as many stages as possible.
Since machines are unable to recognize a full payment legend on a
check, this automation increases the risk that a check may be accepted
by a creditor who fails to notice the full payment legend.69 To reduce
this risk, subsection (c) provides two new ways that a payee can limit
the imposition of an accord and satisfaction.7 ° If an organization is
concerned that a full payment check may slip by its regular processing
procedures, it may send "a conspicuous statement to [its debtors] that
communications concerning disputed debts, including an instrument
tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated
person, office, or place."'" In most cases, debtors who send full
payment checks but fail to comply with the notice requirement will not
accomplish an accord and satisfaction unless more than a "reasonable
time" elapsed between the creditor's most recent notice and the time the
debtor sent the check.72 Alternatively, any recipient of a full payment
69. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 5, 2 U.L.A. 87-88 (1991).
70. According to U.C.C. § 3-311(c):
Subject to subsection (d), a claim is not discharged under subsection (b) if
either of the following applies:
(1) The claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time
before the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person
against whom the claim is asserted that communications concerning disputed
debts, including an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be
sent to a designated person, office, or place, and (ii) the instrument or
accompanying communication was not received by that designated person,
office, or place.
(2) The claimant, whether or not an organization, proves that within 90 days
after payment of the instrument, the claimant tendered repayment of the
amount of the instrument to the person against whom the claim is asserted.
This paragraph does not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a
statement complying with paragraph (l)(i).
U.C.C. § 3-311 (c), 2 U.L.A. 85-86 (1991); see also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note 50,
at 4.17.
71. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(1), 2 U.L.A. 85-86 (1991).
72. U.C.C. § 3-311 (c)(1) & cmt. 5, 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991). Section 3-311(d) provides
an exception to the rule in subsection (c). See infra part IV.B.2. Very little guidance is
offered on what might constitute a "reasonable time":
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check who does not send such a notice may avoid the accord and
satisfaction by repaying the amount of the check to the debtor within
ninety days.73
2. Subsection (d) of Section 3-311 Limits the
Effect of Subsection (c)
Subsection 3-311(d) limits the relief for inadvertent accord and
satisfaction provided to creditors by subsection (c). If the creditor
takes a full payment instrument knowing that an accord and satis-
faction was intended, the rules in subsection (c) designed to prevent
inadvertent accord and satisfaction do not apply.74 This provision
contains some sources of possible confusion." Notwithstanding these
areas of confusion, the goal of preventing creditors from abusing the
section 3-311 (c) safeguards is salutary.
The apparent intent of subsection (d) can be illustrated as follows.
Suppose that a buyer purchases widgets from a seller, dealing with the
manager of the seller's branch office. The seller delivers a shipment of
widgets to the buyer on June 1 and submits a bill for $10,000. The
buyer contacts the manager, disputing the value of this shipment and
claiming that the bill should have been only for $8,000 due to
problems with the widgets. The manager disagrees and declines to
adjust the bill, maintaining that the shipment was worth the full
$10,000.
Suppose further that the buyer delivers a check in the amount of
$9,000 to the manager, payable to the seller and conspicuously marked
"Payment in full for June 1 shipment of widgets." When the buyer
delivers this check, she explains to the manager that she is offering a
compromise to settle the matter. The manager agrees that it is in the
The statement must be given to the customer within a reasonable time before
the tender is made. This requirement is designed to assure that the customer
has reasonable notice that the full satisfaction check must be sent to a
particular place. The reasonable time requirement could be satisfied by a
notice on the billing statement sent to the customer.
U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 5, 2 U.L.A. 88 (1991).
73. U.C.C. § 3-31 1(c)(2), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991).
74. Section 3-311(d) provides:
A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves
that within a reasonable time before collection of the instrument was initiated,
the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having direct responsibility with
respect to the disputed obligation, knew that the instrument was tendered in
full satisfaction of the claim.
U.C.C. § 3-311 (d), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991); see also BAILEY & HAGEDORN, supra note 50, at
4.17.
75. See infra part IV.C.I.
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interest of both parties to settle the dispute, and obtains payment of the
check from the buyer's bank.
In this scenario, both the buyer and the manager intended to
accomplish an accord and satisfaction. If section 3-311 ended with
subsection (c), however, the seller could have an inappropriate means
of escape from the settlement, whether or not it had sent the 3-
311 (c)(1) notice. If the seller had sent the notice and specified that full
payment instruments and communications be sent somewhere other
than to the manager, the accord and satisfaction would not bind the
seller, even though the seller's manager agreed to the settlement and
the buyer is bound by it.76 Alternatively, if the seller had not sent the
notice, it would have a ninety-day option to repudiate the accord and
satisfaction." Subsection (d) is designed to prevent this result,
although it is not a perfect tool for doing so, as explained in the
following section.
C. Evaluation of Section 3-311
If one assumes that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction will
remain a part of American law,78 section 3-311 appears 'to offer a
worthwhile enhancement to the existing common law, although it has
some shortcomings. Subsection 1 of this section points out flaws in
the language of U.C.C. section 3-311(d). Subsection 2 identifies a
risk of refusing a full payment check that is unique to indorsers and
accommodation parties. Subsection 3 then explains the benefits of the
new U.C.C. rules, which reduce the risk of an inadvertent accord and
satisfaction.
1. Drafting Concerns Mar Subsection (d)
In cases involving organizations, the proper relationship between
sections 3-311(d) and 1-201(27) is unclear. The tension between
these two sections raises two questions.
First, the two sections might both apply to the same situation, but
they use different and potentially conflicting phrases to describe the
agent through whom an organization is deemed to receive knowledge.
Section 3-311(d) states that the inadvertent accord and satisfaction
provision (section 3-31 l(c)) is not available if the creditor or its agent
knows the instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim. 79
76. U.C.C. § 3-311 (c)(1), 2 U.L.A. 85-86 (1991).
77. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991).
78. See infra parts V, VI.
79. U.C.C. § 3-311(d), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991). For a summary of the terminology used
in this article, see supra note 9.
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The use of the phrase "the claimant, or an agent of the claimant having
direct responsibility" in section 3-311 (d) creates uncertainty as to the
proper relationship between this provision and section 1-201(27),
which states rules governing how an organization gains knowledge.8 °
If the creditor faced with a full payment check is an organization, it
cannot know anything except through its agent, which suggests that
the rules of section 1-201(27) should apply to determine whether "the
claimant" itself knows of the intended accord and satisfaction. Thus,
section 1-201(27) charges an organization with the knowledge of "the
individual conducting [the particular] transaction.'
On the other hand, section 3-31 l(d) provides a more specific rule
for determining when knowledge of agents is to be imputed to a
principal: an agent's knowledge is to be attributed to the organization
if the agent has "direct responsibility with respect to the disputed
obligation. '82 Unless the reference to "the claimant" in section 3-
311 (d) is surplusage when the claimant is an organization, the question
remains whether "the individual conducting that transaction," under
section 1-201(27), always defines the same group of agents as the
"agent of the claimant having direct responsibility with respect to the
disputed obligation," under section 3-311 (d).
Second, it is unclear whether an agent of an organization must have
actual subjective knowledge of something before the organization will
be deemed to know of it, or whether knowledge will be attributed to
the organization based upon the objective standard of section 1-
201(27). Section 3-31 l(d) might be read to provide that only an
agent's actual knowledge of an accord and satisfaction is to be
attributed to an organization: "A claim is discharged if... an agent of
the claimant . . . knew that the instrument was tendered in full
80. Section 1-201(27) states:
Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification received by an organization is
effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the
attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from
the time when it would have been brought to his attention if the organization
had exercised due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it
maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to
the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with
the routines. Due diligence does not require an individual acting for the
organization to communicate information unless such communication is part
of his regular duties or unless he has reasons to know of the transaction and
that the transaction would be materially affected by the information.
U.C.C. § 1-201(27), 1 U.L.A. 66 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
81. Id.
82. U.C.C. § 3-311 (d), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991).
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satisfaction of the claim. ' 83 Section 3-311 (d) is, however, concerned
not only with the knowledge of agents, but also with the knowledge of
the claimant itself: "A claim is discharged if. . . the claimant, or an
agent of the claimant... knew that the instrument was tendered in full
satisfaction of the claim., 84  To determine the knowledge of the
claimant, it again seems appropriate to look at Section 1-201(27),
which arguably does not distinguish between "knowledge" and
"notice" in dealing with organizations, and which imposes an objective
standard for imputing knowledge to organizations.8 5  Section 1-
201(27) provides that an organization has "[n]otice, knowledge or a
notice or notification ... in any event from the time when it would
have been brought to [the] attention [of the individual conducting the
transaction] if the organization had exercised due diligence. 8 6
Official Comment 7 to section 3-311 attempts to reconcile the two
sections. Although the comment does not address the question of
whether knowledge is determined subjectively or objectively, it does
take the position that for the purposes of section 3-31 l(d), "an agent of
the claimant having direct responsibility 87 is the same thing as "the
individual conducting that transaction."88 While this is not an unrea-
sonable interpretation of the statutory language, it is not the only
possible reading. For example, one might argue that when a full pay-
ment check is sent to a lock box89 account at a bank, the "transaction"
contemplated by section 1-201(27) is merely the deposit of the check
in the appropriate account. In this scenario, a court might conclude
that "the claimant ... knew that the instrument was tendered in full
satisfaction of the claim" 9 based upon the rules of section 1-201(27),
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. The general U.C.C. definition of "knowledge" requires actual knowledge, a
subjective standard. On the other hand, "notice" can result from either actual knowledge
or reason to know, an objective standard. See U.C.C. § 1-201(25), 1 U.L.A. 65-66
(1991).
86. U.C.C. § 1-201(27), 1 U.L.A. 66 (1991) (emphasis added).
87. U.C.C. § 3-311(d), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991).
88. U.C.C. § 1-201(27), 1 U.L.A. 66 (1991). The comment states that "the 'indiv-
idual conducting that transaction' is an employee or other agent of the organization
having direct responsibility with respect to the dispute." U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 7, 2
U.L.A. 88 (1991).
89. A lock box is an arrangement designed to get a creditor's remittances from its
customers into the banking system and available for the creditor's use more quickly.
The customers are instructed to send their remittances to the creditor at a designated post
office box, which is actually maintained by the creditor's bank. The bank opens the
mail, deposits the checks immediately, and then sends the remittance advices to the
creditor so the creditor can record the payments in its accounts receivable records.
90. U.C.C. § 3-311(d), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991) (emphasis added).
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even though the lock box clerk lacked knowledge of the dispute
between the parties and would not qualify as "an agent of the claimant
having direct responsibility with respect to the disputed obligation."9 '
The last paragraph of Official Comment 7 attempts to head off this
interpretation. However, courts do not always follow the Official
Comments.92
2. Refusing a Full Payment Check May Discharge
Indorsers or Accommodation Parties
Often a potential borrower does not alone have sufficient resources
to convince a lender to make the requested loan. There are various
ways that the lender can obtain sufficient assurance of repayment. 93
When a young-adult buys his or her first car, the lender will often
require a parent to share responsibility for repayment. Similarly,
lenders often require that corporate officers be obligated in their
personal capacity for loans made to a corporation. If the parent or
corporate officer in this situation evidences his or her obligation by
signing the promissory note, he or she is referred to as an
"accommodation party. 94 An "indorsement" is a particular type of
signature on a negotiable instrument. 95 A person who places an indor-
sement on an instrument is referred to as an "indorser." 96 An indorser
is obligated to pay the instrument in certain circumstances.97 An
indorser may indorse for accommodation, or for other reasons.98
In addition to the pressures placed upon any creditor faced with a
partial payment check with a full payment legend,99 a creditor holding
a note on which indorsers or accommodation parties are liable faces a
91. U.C.C. § 3-311(d), 2 U.L.A. 86(1991).
92. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 4, at 13.
93. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 13-13, at 576-79.
94. The U.C.C. defines the relevant terminology as follows:
If an instrument is issued for value given for the benefit of a party to the
instrument ("accommodated party") and another party to the instrument
("accommodation party") signs the instrument for the purpose of incurring
liability on the instrument without being a direct beneficiary of the value
given for the instrument, the instrument is signed by the accommodation
party "for accommodation."
U.C.C. § 3-419(a), 2 U.L.A. 125 (1991 & Supp. 1994).
95. U.C.C. § 3-204(a), 2 U.L.A. 54 (1991).
96. U.C.C. § 3-204(b), 2 U.L.A. 54 (1991).
97. See U.C.C. § 3-415, 2 U.L.A. 116 (1991); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, §
13-9, at 561-64;'WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 23, § 13-3, at 14-17.
98. In addition to subjecting the indorser to liability on the instrument, an
indorsement is essential to transfer ownership of certain types of negotiable
instruments. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note I1, § 13-9, at 561.
99. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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special dilemma.'0° Revised U.C.C. section 3-603(b) provides that a
refused tender of payment discharges indorsers and accommodation
parties to the extent of the tender.'0 ' For example, suppose a corpo-
ration bought a machine from a vendor, and the vendor financed the
purchase, requiring the corporate president to sign the note individ-
ually, as well as on behalf of the corporation. Subsequently, the
corporation demands an adjustment of the purchase price, claiming that
the vendor misrepresented the capabilities of the machine. When the
vendor declines to adjust the purchase price, the corporation sends its
check, conspicuously marked "payment in full," to the vendor for half
of the balance on the note. If the vendor obtains payment of the check,
it risks being bound by accord and satisfaction.'0 2 On the other hand,
if the vendor refuses the check and if the president is held to have been
an accommodation party, 0 3 the president's personal liability on the
note will be reduced by half.' °4
Suppose that the vendor returns the check and the corporation
tenders a second check, again marked "payment in full," and again in
an amount equal to half of the note's balance. If the vendor refuses
this second check, it is arguable that the president's personal liability
on the note will be entirely discharged by virtue of revised section 3-
603(b). Specifically, the president's obligation as to half the balance
was discharged by the vendor's refusal of the first check, and the other
half may be discharged by the vendor's refusal to accept the second
check.
3. Section 3-311 Reduces the Risk of Inadvertent
Accord and Satisfaction
Section 3-311 provides two ways to reduce the risk of an
inadvertent accord and satisfaction.'0 5 First, an organization con-
cerned about full payment legends slipping unnoticed past its check
collection procedures can require that such a legend will only be
effective if the check is sent to a special address,' °6 where the check
100. This discussion was suggested by a memorandum from John F. Andrews to the
Alabama Law Institute, U.C.C. Article 3 & 4 Committee (Feb. 25, 1993) (copy on file
with the author).
101. U.C.C. § 3-603(b), 2 U.L.A. 140 (1991).
102. Section 3-311(c) might be of some help to the vendor, but is not pertinent to
the larger issues discussed here. See supra part IV.B. I.
103. Determining whether a particular party to an instrument is an accommodation
party is not always easy. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note I1, § 13-4, at 18-19.
104. See U.C.C. § 3-603(b), 2 U.L.A. 140 (1991).
105. For more discussion of the mechanics of this provision, see supra part IV.B. .
106. U.C.C. § 3-311 (c)(1), 2 U.L.A. 85 (1991). For more discussion of section 3-
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will presumably be scrutinized. Alternatively, a creditor who has not
invoked this special address procedure and who inadvertently
negotiates a full payment check may avoid the accord and satisfaction
by returning the proceeds within ninety days.'0 7
Both of these alternatives ameliorate the potentially harsh result
which may occur if a creditor inadvertently accepts a full payment
check because of failure either to notice the full payment legend or to
understand its legal significance. Of course, these protections are
neither free nor foolproof. To avail itself of this protection, a creditor
must incur costs to set up an additional location for the receipt of
checks. Furthermore, if a creditor does not arrange to have checks
sent to a special address, there remains the risk that a creditor might
obtain payment of a full payment check and not realize the significance
of the legend until the ninety-day period for returning the proceeds has
expired.
Some commentators have criticized section 3-31 l(c)(1) for giving
organizations a form of protection that is not available to
individuals.'0 8 Notwithstanding this criticism, section 3-31 1(c)(2)
may offer more potential benefits to individuals than to organizations.
The average individual is probably less sophisticated about the rules of
accord and satisfaction than the average corporate manager of accounts
receivable. Therefore, individuals may face more risk than organ-
izations in dealing with a full payment instrument without recognizing
the legal consequences. An individual who receives a check with a full
payment legend from an insurance company in an amount less than the
claim may not be aware that accepting the check can cut off the right to
pursue the disputed additional portion of the claim. The ninety-day
window presented in section 3-311(c)(2) increases the chance for an
unsophisticated creditor to realize his error before it is too late to avoid
its application."°
311 (c)(1), see supra part IV.B.1.
107. U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991).
108. See Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REV. 679, 691-94 (1991); Jay Winston, The
Evolution of Accord and Satisfaction: Common Law: U.C.C. Section 1-207: U.C.C.
Section 3-311, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 189, 219-21 (1993). More generally, these
articles assert that section 3-311 does not do enough for consumers, suggesting, inter
alia, that the word "direct" should be deleted from section 3-311(d). See Hillebrand,
supra, at 694; Winston, supra, at 226.
109.. Cf. U.C.C. § 3-311 cmts. 1, 3, 2 U.L.A. 86-87 (1991) (suggesting situations
where the creditor is an individual and the debtor is an insurance company).
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Moreover, many corporations need to process large numbers of
checks at low cost," ° but few if any individuals need to do so.
Because organizations face challenges in check processing different
from those of individuals, it seems reasonable to provide organizations
with special consideration. If an individual wishes to bind an organ-
ization to an accord and satisfaction and has been notified of the place
to send full payment checks, he or she should bear the responsibility
for sending the full payment check. to the place where it will get
appropriate attention.
The rules of new section 3-31 l(c) place hurdles unknown to the
common law before the debtor wishing to impose an accord and
satisfaction,"' but these hurdles do not seem unreasonable. A debtor
who wishes to impose an accord and satisfaction on an organization
under section 3-311 must determine whether the organization has
specified a "person, office, or place" as the focal point for disputed
debts, and must be sure to send the full payment check to the right
place. If the organization has not specified a place to receive disputed
debts, the debtor cannot be assured that the matter is resolved until
ninety days after the check is paid." 2 Section 3-31 l(c) makes it more
difficult to establish an accord and satisfaction, but it hardly imposes
crippling burdens upon a debtor who is trying in good faith to reach a
fair resolution of a dispute.' 13
110. U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 5, 2 U.L.A. 87 (1991).
I 1 I. At common law, the creditor bore the burden of identifying checks with a full
payment legend, and a creditor who obtained payment of such a check was bound by the
resulting accord and satisfaction without any grace period for returning the funds. See
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 1I, § 13-24, at 607-08.
1 12. See U.C.C. § 3-311(c)(2), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991).
1 13. For debtors frustrated by ineffective attempts to communicate with a creditor's
unresponsive computer, section 3-31 l(c)(l) would actually seem likely to increase the
probability of getting the creditor's attention. An organization will likely give careful
consideration before setting up a separate location for the receipt of full payment
checks. In addition to the effort and administrative expense required for such a step,
invoking the protection of section 3-311 (c)(1) requires waiving the 90-day grace period
of section 3-311 (c)(2). U.C.C. § 3-31 l(c)(2), 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991) (see last sentence).
Moreover, a blanket strategy of merely rejecting any and all full payment checks seems
unwise for creditors. The creditor may be better off accepting the compromise in some
cases, and rejection of a tendered check may release accommodation parties to the extent
of the tendered payment. See supra part IV.C.2. It therefore seems likely that a creditor
that incurs trouble and expense to specify a separate location for the receipt of full
payment checks will staff this office with personnel who are both capable of
recognizing the full-payment legends and responsible for taking appropriate action.
Thus, section 3-311 (c)(l) is something of a substitute for the once-effective technique of
folding, spindling, or mutilating a computer punch card. See Rosenthal, supra note 4, at
56, where the author states:
In the early days of automated billing, punch cards were commonly used, and
the debtor could often attract human attention to his communication by
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Insuring adequate and appropriate protection for debtors is a worthy
goal. It would be unwise, however, to give debtors every possible
remedy without considering the costs that would be imposed on
others' interests. Moreover, some debtor "protections" may actually
be adverse to debtor interests, because burdens initially imposed on
others may be shifted back to the debtor in a different form." 4
V. IS ACCORD AND SATISFACTION BENEFICIAL?
Much of the debate over accord and satisfaction focuses on the
appropriate reach of the doctrine-the circumstances in which a court
should conclude that a creditor is bound by the full payment legend on
a check. However, a more fundamental issue bears examination:
Should we allow a full payment check to bind a creditor to an accord
and satisfaction at all?
The usual justification for the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is
that it promotes dispute resolution." 5 This is not a new idea; the New:
York Court of Appeals, for example, has held this idea for many
years. 1 6 One way to evaluate the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is
to compare the benefits received by the beneficiaries to the costs
imposed on those harmed. An excess of costs over benefits would
suggest that the doctrine makes society as a whole worse off, and
should therefore be constrained or eliminated. Conversely, an excess
of benefits over costs would suggest that the doctrine is advantageous
to society as a whole. Economists call this approach the Kaldor-Hicks
folding, spindling, or mutilating the card. Alas, modern technology has
developed the computer printout, which affords no such mechanical device to
attract the attention of any human being, much less a responsible one, to the
customer's communications.
Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 56.
114. See, e.g., ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION:
COMPETITION, COORDINATION & CONTROL 64-68 (3d ed. 1983) (stating that tax imposed
on supplier may be shifted to purchaser). For negative assessments of section 3-311,
see Hillebrand, supra note 108, at 691-94, and Winston, supra note 108, at 218-26.
115. The drafters of the 1990 U.C.C. revisions subscribed to this view, stating:
"Section 3-311 is based on a belief that the common law rule [of accord and satisfaction]
produces a fair result and that informal dispute resolution by full satisfaction checks
should be encouraged." U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 3, 2 U.L.A. 86-87 (1991).
116. As early as 1914, the high court of the State of New York stated:
The law wisely favors settlements, and where there is a real and genuine
contest between the parties, and a settlement is had without fraud or
misrepresentation, for an amount determined upon as a compromise between
the conflicting claims, such settlement should be upheld, although such
amount is materially less than the amount claimed by the person to whom it is
paid.
Post v. Thomas, 106 N.E. 69, 72 (N.Y.), remittitur denied, 106 N.E. 1042 (N.Y. 1914).
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definition of efficiency.' 17
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction is obviously beneficial to
parties who understand the significance of the full payment legend and
use it knowingly. In cases where parties to a dispute understand the
relevant considerations and wish to enter into a final, binding settle-
ment, using a full payment legend saves the trouble and expense of
executing a formal settlement agreement or release. Where parties
enter into an accord and satisfaction knowingly and voluntarily, they
likely consider their arrangement advantageous, or else they would not
enter into it." 18 As long as both parties understand the consequences
of a full payment check, enforcing the rules of accord and satisfaction
should be beneficial to all parties. Conversely, non-enforcement
would frustrate the parties' expectations.
On the other hand, not every creditor receiving a full payment check
will notice the legend and understand its significance. Perhaps the
most compelling criticism of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction is
that it creates a trap for the unwary creditor. " 9 Two types of creditors
might unintentionally accept a full payment check, thereby entering
into an accord and satisfaction. First, unsophisticated creditors may
see a full payment legend on a check but fail to appreciate its rami-
fications. In addition, because of advances in check processing
technology, even sophisticated creditors might reasonably choose not
to scrutinize each check, so a full payment legend might slip by
unnoticed.' 20 The drafters of section 3-311 were concerned about the
risk of an inadvertent accord and satisfaction. 12' Although these
concerns seem plausible, more empirical data is needed to properly
assess the significance of this risk.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify and compare the
relative benefits and costs. It is not clear, however, that the overall
benefits of the doctrine exceed the costs. The reductions in transaction
costs to be realized from the doctrine are probably not trivial, but
117. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (4th ed. 1992). This
approach has serious limitations. For example, it is often difficult to measure the costs
and benefits. Id. Moreover, it is not always clear that the benefits to one group are
sufficient justification for a policy that imposes costs on another group, particularly if
the burdened group receives no compensation. See id. at 14-16. Even with these
limitations in mind, it will nevertheless be instructive to consider the possible
relationships between the benefits and costs of accord and satisfaction.
118. Cf. ALCIIIAN & ALLEN, supra note 114, at 45-48, 52-53 (explaining the reasons
people trade with each other, and the benefits derived therefrom).
119. Not all commentators agree that this is a problem. See, e.g., Hillebrand, supra
note 108, at 691-92.
120. See Shanker, supra note 21, at 8.
121. See U.C.C. § 3-311 cmts. 5-6, 2 U.L.A. 87-88 (1991).
1994]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 26
neither are they likely to be very large. If full payment legends on
checks were not enforced, parties wishing to settle a disputed debt
would have to enter into a more formal agreement, and transaction
costs would increase. On the other hand, this increase does not seem
particularly significant, at least in cases where the parties have know-
ingly reached a settlement and intend to document it. If both parties
are sophisticated enough to understand the implications of dealing with
a full payment check, they should be able to draft an appropriate
settlement or release without much additional effort. 2 2 More impor-
tantly, the costs of an unintended accord and satisfaction to an
unsuspecting, (i.e., unsophisticated) party can be quite significant. 1 3
Furthermore, one cannot say with confidence whether the doctrine
generally favors either business or consumer interests. 124 In some
situations, consumer interests gain from the availability of accord and
satisfaction. For example, an incorrectly billed consumer who re-
peatedly receives demands for payment from a creditor's computer,
122. Any dispute that can be resolved by tender and acceptance of a full payment
check, with the full knowledge and understanding of both parties, is likely to be a
relatively simple dispute which could also be resolved by a simple settlement
agreement. The resolution of a complex or intractable dispute will usually require a
correspondingly complex (and expensive) settlement agreement, if any agreement can
be reached at all. A complex or intractable dispute is unlikely to be solved to the
ultimate satisfaction of both parties by an accord and satisfaction, although a full
payment check may put an end to the dispute if the creditor does not pay appropriate
attention to the full payment legend. A debtor attempting to trap an unwary creditor into
an inadvertent accord and satisfaction would have a much greater challenge if full
payment legends on checks were not enforced. However, this is not an attractive
argument in favor of enforcing full payment legends; in fact, this is probably the
strongest argument against enforcing them.
123. The use of a negotiable instrument in the typical accord and satisfaction should
not cloud this analysis. Many of the rules governing negotiable instruments are
designed to facilitate the acceptance of negotiable instruments by third parties, making
them more useful in commerce. See, e.g., WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 11, § 14-1, at
613-14. An accord and satisfaction, however, affects only the rights and liabilities of
the two parties. Even if a check is evidence of an accord and satisfaction, third parties'
rights to payment of that check are unaffected.
124. U.C.C. § 3-311 cmt. 3, 2 U.L.A. 86 (1991); see also Rosenthal, supra note 4, at
55. In some ways, the dichotomy between consumer interests and business interests is
false. In many ways, consumers are involved in business organizations. Similarly,
businesses and other organizations consume many types of products and services. The
terms are used here in recognition of the widely held view that consumers are thought to
deserve certain protections from businesses because consumers tend to be less
sophisticated or tend to have less bargaining power than the businesses with which they
deal. See, e.g.; DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW XXV
(1991) ("Our American sense of fair play is badly injured by the outrages practiced daily
upon consumers: rapacious plundering too much for any law to ignore."); Stephen
Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and
Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 558-59 (1979) (describing unequal bargaining power as
one of the "minor justifications" for regulation).
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despite attempts to obtain a correction, may find a full payment check
quite useful. 25 On the other hand, business interests may use the
availability of accord and satisfaction to gain the upper hand in dealing
with consumers. For example, an insurance company may use the full
payment check to encourage a consumer to settle a disputed claim.
26
In summary, accord and satisfaction is traditionally viewed as
beneficial because it helps resolve disputes. It is certainly true that
some disputes can be more easily resolved by accord and satisfaction
than by other means. It is not at all clear, however, that the availability
of accord and satisfaction offers benefits that exceed the related costs.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the rules of commercial law were being written on a clean slate, it
might be better to deny enforcement of full payment checks. Accord
and satisfaction is a useful shorthand for parties who understand it and
use it knowingly. It is not clear, however, that this benefit outweighs
the potential harm to parties who inadvertently become bound by an
accord and satisfaction. In any event, accord and satisfaction is
probably so firmly entrenched in American common law that it would
be impossible to eradicate, and eliminating it may cause more trouble
than it would prevent. This alone may well be a sufficient reason to
keep the doctrine.
More empirical information would be useful in order to assess the
frequency and significance of inadvertent accord and satisfaction and
the relative weight of consumers' and businesses' concerns. The
drafters of the new U.C.C. section 3-311 have made plausible
assumptions that the inadvertent entry into an accord and satisfaction is
a significant concern and that organizations have special concerns
about accord and satisfaction that are not faced by individuals. Despite
its critics, 27 new section 3-311 offers worthwhile improvements over
the common law rules and provides ways for creditors to reduce
substantially the risk of an inadvertent accord and satisfaction without
placing an unfair additional burden on debtors. However, as long as
full payment legends on checks are enforced, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, to eliminate completely the potential trap for the unwary.
125. Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 56. For further detail, see supra note 113.
126. Rosenthal, supra note 4, at 55.
127. Seesupra part V.C.I and note 108.
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